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However, the mere fact that this type of case does not fall under
the "safe-place statute" does not relieve the owner from liability under
doctrines of common law negligence, nor does it prevent the application
of res ipsa loquitur. Although the owner of a building is not an insurer
to those in and around his building, he is bound to use reasonable care
in construction and maintenance in order to avoid injuries to the public
which fall within the range of foreseeable harm as defined at com-
mon law.'0
SAMUEL WEITZEN
Torts--Liabilty under Federal Employers' Liability Act-The plain-
tiff brought suit as administrator of the estate of Peter Anastis against
the Erie Railroad Co., for wrongful death under the Federal Employ-
ers' Liability Act. The decedent had been employed by the defendant
as a yard foreman since 1913, and for several years had been hard of
hearing. On November 22, 1944, which was a clear day, the decedent
with his gang was working in the Youngstown, Ohio, yards of the de-
fendant. The tracks in this yard ran in a general east and west direc-
tion and a toolhouse was located just south of the tracks. At 12:10 the
decedent and his men left their place of work to go to lunch, which
they always ate in the toolhouse. About that time a regular freight
train of the defendant came into the yard and stopped about where the
men had been working. This was the only engine in the yard when the
men stopped working. One of the decedent's men testified that just
before the decedent reached the toolhouse he turned and walked across
the tracks in a northerly direction, while the men entered the toolhouse
where they ate their lunch and talked together. This witness further
testified that the door of the toolhouse remained open, but he heard no
movement of trains or bells or whistles sounding. After lunch the men
went to look for their foreman and found his body lying across the
tracks about seven hundred feet west of the point where he had last
been seen. How he traveled that seven hundred feet, whether by foot
or on a moving train, did not appear. No one saw the accident. There
was no evidence as to flow the decedent met his death except that he
was run over by one of the defendant's trains, presumably by the one
which was in the yard and departed during the thirty minutes which
elapsed between the time the decedent was last seen and the time his
body was found. The plaintiff contended that the evidence showed the
defendant negligent in not maintaining a lookout and in not giving a
signal of warning. The District Court directed the jury to return a
verdict for the defendant. From this verdict the plaintiff appealed.
10 Harper on Torts, Chapter 7.
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Held in an action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, the plain-
tiff must establish by evidence that the defendant was negligent, and
a jury may not speculate and formulate a plausible theory as to where
and how the accident happened, and then speculate on what it was that
the railroad company- did that was negligent and caused the accident.
Trust Co. of Chicago v. Erie R. Co. (C.C.A.7, Feb. 6, 1948) 165 F.
(2d) 806.
The decision in the principal case appears to call a halt to the recent
trend in railroad cases. The recent trend has been fully treated by Mr.
Raymond J. Moore in a recent law review article.' In his article Mr.
Moore traced the development of railroad liability for injury to em-
ployees at common law, and discussed the common law doctrine of as-
sumption of risk by the employee of the employer's negligence when the
fact of such negligence was known to him, or was so plainly observable
that he was presumed to have known of it. His article further dis-
cussed the effect of the Federal Employers' Liability Act of 1906 which
allowed recovery against a railroad for injuries resulting from its neg-
ligence but which set up contributory negligence as a bar to such re-
covery; and of the Federal Employers' Liability Act of 1908 which
abolished contributory negligence as a bar to recovery and substituted
the doctrine of comparative negligence, and further provided that no
employee should be held guilty of contributory negligence in any case
where the violation of any safety appliance act contributed to the in-
jury. Finally the article in question discussed the proviso added by
amendment in 1939 which abolished assumption of risk where the in-
jury resulted from the negligence of the railroad. As a result of this
latter amendment Congress in effect abolished the defense of non-neg-
ligence.
Mr. Moore cited numerous cases which interpret the various pro-
.visions of all the acts listed above. For the purpose of reviewing the
instant case the cases which interpret the amendment of the Federal
Employers' Liability Act adopted in 1939 are especially important. The
effect of the decisions in these cases is to make a railroad practically
an insurer of its employees. As judicially interpreted, proximate cause
under the act as amended need not be the direct, the complete, the re-
sponsible and efficient cause of the injury, but it is sufficient if the neg-
ligence of the railroad has some causal relation to the injury and if the
injury or death resulted in part from a defendant's negligence. The
Supreme Court has, in these decisions, refused to deny recovery as a
matter of law on the ground that the evidence is speculative or con-
jectural where causal connection between the injury sustained and the
negligence of the carrier appears even inferentially. Thus, though there
1 Moore, "Recent Trends in Railroad Cases," 29 Marq. L. Rev. 73 (1946).
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was no direct evidence as to the cause of the accident which resulted in
the death of the employee, the court had no difficulty in finding that
there was substantial proof that the death of the injured employee was
caused by the railroad's negligence in failing to ring a bell in one case, 2
and in failing to provide a light in another case.3
The sole question under the Federal Employers' Liability Act is
whether the defendent was guilty of negligence. The rule is well estab-
lished that where uncertainty as to the existence of negligence arises
from a conflict in the testimony, or where the facts being undisputed,
fairminded men would honestly draw different conclusions, the question
is not of law but one of fact to be settled by the jury. As a result of
this rule the court has looked unsympathetically upon directed verdicts
in cases arising under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, possibly
because it feels that, since there is no Federal Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act, to deprive these workers of benefit of a jury trial in close or
doubtful cases is to take away a goodly portion of the relief which Con-
gress intended to afford them.
Decisions handed down since Mr. Moore's article was published all
follow the trend described in that article.4 The courts appear extremely
reluctant to take a case from the jury under any circumstances. In this
regard they reason that the focal point of judicial review is the rea-
sonableness of a particular inference or conclusion drawn by a jury,
and it is not the function of the court to search the record for conflict-
ing circumstantial evidence in order to take the case from the jury on
a theory that the proof gives equal support to inconsistent and uncertain
inferences. They feel that the jury, as the fact-finding body, has the
function of selecting from among conflicting inferences and conclusions
those which it considers most reasonable.5
In the principle case the court distinguishes the cases cited by Mr.
Moore and the writer on the ground that in each of them there was
some evidence of negligence shown or conflicts in evidence as to neg-
ligence which the jury might have to resolve, and in the resolution of
which the jury might have to speculate. "But here," the court says,
'.Tennant v. Peoria & P.U. Ry. Co., 321 U.S. 29, 88 L. Ed. 520, 64 S. Ct. 409
(1944).
3Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 87 L. Ed. 610, 63 S. Ct.
444 (1943) ; Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 323 U.S. 574, 89 L. Ed. 403, 65
S. Ct. 421 (1945).
4 Boston & M.R. R. v. Meech, 329 U.S. 763, 91 L.Ed. 68, 67 S.Ct. 124 (1946);
Pearce v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., (C.C.A. 3, 1946) 157 F. (2d) 252; Handy v.
Reading Co., (D.C. Pennsylvania, 1946) 66 F. Supp. 246; Boston & M.R.R. v.
Kyle, (C.C.A. 1, 1946) 156 F. (2d) 112; Bocook v. Louisville & N.R. Co.(D.C. Kentucky, 1946) 67 F. Supp. 154; Pitt v. Penn. R. Co. (D.C. Pennsyl-
vania, 1946) 66 F. Supp. 443; Chicago St. P. & M. R. Co. v. Arnold (C.C.A. 8,
1947) 160 F. (2d) 1005; Ellis v. Union Pacific R. Co., 329 U.S. 649, 91 L.Ed.
572, 67 S.Ct. 598 (1947).
5 O'Brien v. Chicago & N.W. R. Co., 329 Ill. App. 382, 68 N.E. (2d) 638 (1946).
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"there is no conflict and a total failure of proof, the jury would have
no probative evidence on which to base its verdict and would have to
substitute speculation, which it may not do."
The Court recognizes the recent trend'in cases of this type when it
says in its opinion:
"We realize that cases arising under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act approach so closely the line which makes the rail-
road an insurer of its employees that we tread on thin ice in up-
holding a District Court that has directed a verdict under the
Act especially when we also realize that a strong minority of the
Supreme Court supports the thesis that any common law case
in which a jury may be demanded should never be taken from
the jury, since the jury must be deemed to be as capable of find-
ing a correct answer as the court."
However, this court felt constrained to sustain the District Court
in its direction of a verdict because here there was a total failure of
proof of negligence. It did so upon the basis of general holdings of the
Supreme Court to the effect that negligence must be shown and in the
absence thereof a verdict must be directed."
LEONARD CZAPLEWSKI
6 Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 395, 87 L.Ed. 1458, 63 S.Ct. 1077,
1089 (1938).
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